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Abstract 
Dobzhansky argued that biology only makes sense if life on earth has a shared 
history. But his dictum is often reinterpreted to mean that biology only makes sense in 
the light of adaptation. Some philosophers of science have argued in this spirit that 
all work in ‘proximal’ biosciences such as anatomy, physiology and molecular 
biology must be framed, at least implicitly, by the selection histories of the organisms 
under study. Others have denied this and have proposed non-evolutionary ways in 
which biologists can frame these investigations. This paper argues that an 
evolutionary perspective is indeed necessary, but that it must be a forward-looking 
perspective informed by a general understanding of the evolutionary process, not a 
backward-looking perspective informed by the specific evolutionary history of the 
species being studied. Interestingly, it turns out that there are aspects of proximal 
biology that even a creationist cannot study except in the light of a theory of their 
effect on future evolution. 
 
1. Dobzhansky’s dictum 
 
Classic scientific articles are often more cited than read. ‘Nothing in biology makes 
sense except in the light of evolution’ by the Ukranian-American geneticist 
Theodosius Dobzhansky (1973) is no exception. It argues that the observed diversity 
of life and its distribution on the earth’s surface make no sense when viewed as the 
result of the special creation of each species by God. These observations make good 
sense, however, when viewed as the result of evolution. They are the kinds of patterns 
we would expect to see if life on earth had evolved. To a large extent Dobzhansky 
drew on the same sources of evidence as Darwin: comparative anatomy, embryology, 
and biogeography. But writing in the 1970s he could supplement this evidence with 
early examples of what we would today call comparative genomics and comparative 
proteomics. Like the distribution of characters in anatomy and embryology, the 
observed distribution of molecular characters makes sense only if the genomes that 
exist today have a shared ancestry. Dobzhansky himself, an Orthodox Christian as 
well as a leading geneticist, argued that God used evolution to produce the diversity 
of life. 
 
So for Dobzhansky himself, biology only makes sense in the light of evolution 
because it only makes sense if life on earth has a shared history. This shared history is  
                                                 
1 I am grateful to Lawrence Shapiro and the editors of this special issue for comments on an earlier 
draft and to audiences at the Australian National University, University of Exeter, and Oregon State 
University for their comments on seminar presentations of these ideas. 
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Dobzhansky in 1955 near the Cristo Redentor de los Andes monument on the 
Chile/Argentina border. Photo courtesy of Charles Birch. 
 
sometimes called the ‘fact of evolution’ in contrast to the ‘mechanism of evolution’. 
Dobzhansky had no doubt that natural selection is the basic mechanism of evolution, 
but he accepted that there was room for dispute about how natural selection operates 
and how it interacts with other proposed mechanisms such as drift. ‘Evolution as a 
process that has always gone on in the history of the earth can be doubted only by 
those who are ignorant of the evidence or are resistant to evidence, owing to 
emotional blocks or to plain bigotry. By contrast, the mechanisms that bring evolution 
about certainly need study and clarification.’ (Dobzhansky, 1973, 129. For more on 
the original intention and context of Dobzhansky’s article, see Burian, 2005, Ch. 6) 
 
Today, however, Dobzhansky’s dictum is often understood in a different sense. It is 
taken to mean that the structure of living organisms only makes sense when viewed as 
a set of evolutionary adaptations to specific selection pressures. Nothing in biology 
makes sense except in the light of adaptation. For example, the dictum is cited in 
support of the view that psychology will make better progress once it learns to see the 
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human mind as a set of adaptations to the human ‘environment of evolutionary 
adaptedness’ (e.g. Gintis, 2007). The view that nothing makes sense except in the 
light of adaptation has also been endorsed by some philosophers of science, as I 
discuss in Sections two and three below. Philosopher Alexander Rosenberg has 
argued that the structure of the genome only makes sense when viewed as a set of 
adaptations and that individual genes are, or at least should be, defined by the 
purposes for which they are adapted (Rosenberg, 2001). In these discussions it is clear 
that what is meant by ‘makes sense’ is not only that biological phenomena are as we 
would expect them to be if they had been produced by these selection histories, but 
also that classifying biological parts and processes as the products of particular 
selection histories is a productive way to frame investigations into the details of their 
form and function. 
 
These recent ideas are a long way from what Dobzhansky meant when he formulated 
his famous dictum. His article makes frequent reference to the process of adaptation, 
but it does not use the fact that organisms are well adapted to argue for the reality of 
evolution. It was obvious to Dobzhansky, as it was to Darwin, that evolution by 
natural selection and special creation both predict that organisms will be well adapted. 
But only evolution predicts the patterns seen in comparative biology and in 
biogeography. For example, Dobzhansky pointed out that the Hawaian islands have a 
diversity of Drosophila species unmatched anywhere else on earth. This is the sort of 
pattern that evolution leads us to expect, since the Hawaian islands are geologically 
young and geographically isolated. Whichever species first colonised them would 
have an opportunity to fill a range of unoccupied ecological niches. On the hypothesis 
of special creation, however, the extraordinary diversity of the Hawaian relatives of 
the fruit fly can only be explained as a piece of divine whimsy. 
 
My focus in this article is on philosophical arguments in favour of the modern 
reinterpretation of Dobzhansky’s dictum, according to which nothing makes sense 
except in the light of adaptation (Millikan, 2002; Neander, 2002; Rosenberg, 2001, 
2006). There are two main arguments to confront, both of which are most clearly 
stated by Ruth Millikan. The first is that evolutionary history distinguishes an 
organism's biological functioning from processes that are not part of its biological 
functioning. Kangaroos eat grass and also get caught in bushfires, but kangaroo 
physiology only studies the former of these two processes. It is the selective history of 
the kangaroo that makes it correct to study the physiology of the kangaroo’s digestive 
system, but not the ‘physiology’ of the kangaroo's 'combustion system'. The second 
argument is that the selection history of an organism defines the parts and processes 
into which that organism can be divided. This particular part of the kangaroo is a 
colon, not a liver, and that parasitic worm is not part of the kangaroo at all. These 
distinctions, it is alleged, only make sense in terms of the selective history of the 
kangaroo. Taken together these arguments suggest that even the most apparently 
straightforward, descriptive work in biology implicitly makes claims about the 
adaptive purpose of the parts and processes that are described. However, despite its 
superficial appeal, the view that ‘nothing in biology makes sense except in the light of 
adaptation’ leads to paradox. If it were true, then we could not do biology, as I show 
in Section four. 
 
In the past few years a number of other philosophers of science have questioned the 
idea that nothing in biology makes sense except in the light of evolution, whether in 
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Dobzhansky’s original sense of shared history or in the revised sense of a history of 
adaptation (Weber, 2005; Wouters, 2005a, 2005b, 2007). They have pointed out that 
much successful research in fields such as physiology and molecular biology is 
conducted by scientists who have minimal information about the evolution of the 
parts and processes they study, that those scientists often evince little interest in 
finding out the details of their evolution, and that the acquiring knowledge of those 
details would be very difficult. They make a powerful prima facie case that these 
areas of biology make sense without the light of evolution, as I describe in Section 
five. In Sections six and seven, however, I will show that this second group of 
philosophers are also mistaken and that we do need an evolutionary perspective in 
order to make sense of physiology, molecular biology and the like. Ruth Millikan and 
others are correct in their contention that an evolutionary perspective is needed to 
identify which activities count as ‘biological functioning’. But the evolutionary 
perspective which plays this role does not view organisms as things that have evolved, 
but as things that are evolving. It is a forward-looking perspective informed by a 
general understanding of the evolutionary process, not a backward-looking 
perspective informed by the specific evolutionary history of the species being studied. 
So one important part of this paper will be to distinguish these two very different 
senses in which one can speak of an ‘evolutionary perspective’. 
 
 
2. Defining biological function 
 
There are two, key senses of function in the biological sciences (Godfrey-Smith, 
1993; Griffiths, 1992, 1993). One is selected function, also known as ‘selected effect’, 
‘etiological’ or ‘proper’ function (Millikan, 1984; Neander, 1991a). The other is 
causal function, also known as ‘causal role’ or ‘Cummins’ function (Cummins, 1975, 
see also Wimsatt, 1972). The difference between these two senses can be made clear 
by an example: 
 
• Selected function: a sequence of nucleotides TATAAA has the selected 
function of binding transcription factors if that sequence evolved by natural 
selection because it had the effect of binding transcription factors in ancestral 
organisms 
 
• Causal function: a sequence of nucleotides TATAAA has the causal function 
of binding transcription factors if that sequence has the effect of binding 
transcription factors in the organism in which it occurs 
 
The distinction between these two notions of function is closely related to the 
conventional neo-Darwinian distinction between adaptations, which have evolved by 
natural selection, and adaptive traits, which increase the fitness of organisms that 
possess them relative to other types. Every adaptation was once an adaptive trait, but 
not all adaptations are still adaptive.  Conversely, not every adaptive trait has the 
selective history required to make it an adaptation. A trait is an adaptation if it has 
some selected function(s).  A trait is adaptive if it has causal functions which 
contribute to the overall fitness of the organism. 
 
There has long been a consensus that only selected function is genuinely teleological 
or ‘teleonomic’ (Pittendrigh, 1958; Brandon, 1981). Hence only selected function can 
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be used to distinguish a trait’s functioning from the same trait malfunctioning or 
having biologically irrelevant side-effects (Millikan, 1984; Neander, 1991b; Papineau, 
1987). A standard example is supposed to make this clear: the sounds made by the 
human heart, although very useful to doctors, are a mere side effect. Making a noise 
that can be detected through a stethoscope is not one of the functions of the human 
heart. The philosophical consensus is that this is true because the sounds made by the 
heart did not increase the fitness of our ancestors relative to their evolutionary rivals.  
But I have come to doubt that this is the only way in which biologists distinguish 
between function, malfunction and side effect (see particularly Griffiths, 2006). Other 
recent authors who have departed from this longstanding consensus include Paul 
Sheldon Davies and Tim Lewens (Davies, 2001; Lewens, 2004). The older literature 
on functional analysis also recognised that there may be reasons other than their 
evolutionary role for singling out some functions as those in terms of which 
performance should be evaluated (Cummins, 1975, 1983; Wimsatt, 1972).  
 
There are clearly some contexts in which the function/malfunction/effect distinction is 
drawn by looking at adaptation. These are contexts in which scientists are focusing on 
evolutionary questions. Suppose for example, that a behavioural ecologist asks 
whether it is the function of individual variation in birdsong to allow individual 
recognition by conspecifics, or whether this is only a side effect. Perhaps individual 
recognition is the unavoidable consequence of conveying information about mate 
quality. It is plausible to interpret this question as asking about the selection pressures 
that shaped birdsong. But this interpretation is often implausible when applied to 
questions in 'proximal' (Mayr, 1961) or 'experimental' (Weber, 2005) areas of biology 
– disciplines such as anatomy, physiology, developmental and molecular biology. In 
these contexts I do not believe that attempts to identify the function of parts and 
processes are typically attempts to identify the purposes for which those parts and 
processes are adaptations. This is not to say that the functions identified by these 
sciences do not in many cases coincide with selected functions of the relevant parts. 
The point is that ‘proximal’ biologists do not need to take a stand on this, historical 
question in order to correctly identify function. The identification of function in these 
biosciences seems to be a straightforward experimental matter. Ascriptions of 
function are confidently made by biologists who take organisms apart and examine 
their workings but do not test hypotheses about their evolution.  Identifying the 
selection pressures that drove the evolution of these parts and processes would be far 
more difficult and would require additional forms of evidence that these scientists 
simply do not collect (Amundson & Lauder, 1994; Pigliucci & Kaplan, 2006). This 
suggests that they are not ascribing selected function but something closer to causal 
function. 
 
The view that I will defend later in this paper is that these function ascriptions 
correspond to a special set of causal functions – roughly, those that contribute to the 
causal capacities of the organism that are relevant to understanding its evolutionary 
fate. This is a 'forward-looking', evolutionary sense of function as opposed to the 
backwards-looking evolutionary sense of selected function. Forward-looking 
evolutionary analyses of function ascriptions in biology have been proposed before 
(Bigelow & Pargetter, 1987; Canfield, 1964), but the view that such a sense of 
‘function’ plays a significant role in biology has never been widely accepted. 
 
3. Defining biological functioning 
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The view that the parts and processes of organisms are defined by their selected 
functions was made popular by the writings of Millikan and Karen Neander (see 
especially Millikan, 2002; Neander, 2002), although it has also been strongly 
advocated by Rosenberg (2001, 2006). Millikan offers a very general argument for 
supposing that biological characters must be defined by selected function. She argues 
that a purely descriptive biology, unaided by evolutionary teleology, has no principled 
way to determine what counts as the system in need of analysis. Biologists need to 
identify whether something is part of an organism's biological functioning, as opposed 
to an irrelevant causal processes like the process a kangaroo undergoes when it is 
burnt in a bushfire. Biologists also need to distinguish normal traits from pathologies, 
and to delimit the boundaries of a single organism, so as, for example, not to 
confound the kangaroo and its fleas. However, 
 
"Living chunks of matter do not come, just as such, with instructions about 
what are allowable conditions of operation and what is to count as allowable 
input. Similarly, they do not come with instructions telling [what is] damage, 
breakdowns or weardowns. Nor do they come with instructions about which 
processes…are to count as occurring within and which are irrelevant or 
accidental to the system.” (Millikan, 2002, 121) 
 
Millikan’s point is that it is not simply given which parts of the physical world, and 
which properties of those parts, form the subject matter of biology. The three 
problems she identifies are all aspects of defining which parts and processes constitute 
the biological functioning of an organism. 
 
These are not trivial problems. For over a century after sperm were first observed in 
1678 the hypothesis that they were part of the mechanism of generation was 
confronted by the rival hypotheses that they were parasites or that they were the 
results of decay like the microorganisms observed in many other liquids derived from 
living matter (Gasking, 1967). Some investigators who accepted that sperm were part 
of the mechanism of generation hypothesised that their function was to agitate the 
seminal fluid with their flagella. Even today it is debated whether the some of the 
different sperm morphologies seen in a single ejaculate have specialised functions or 
whether they are pathological (Moore, Martin, & Birkhead, 1999). So although it is 
easy to forget about these problems in areas of biology where they have been solved, 
the problems are real. The question is how biologists solve them. 
 
According to Millikan, the problem of defining biological functioning is solved by 
studying only those features of an organism which represent evolutionary design, and 
by classifying the parts of the organism in terms of the purposes for which they were 
designed – their selected functions. For example, a riboswitch is a region of 
untranslated mRNA that regulates expression of the gene from which it is transcribed 
by directly binding a metabolite. One of the first riboswitches was identified in the 
leader sequence of the btuB RNA in E.coli (Nahvi et al., 2002). It was already known 
that RNA can bind these sorts of small metabolites, and that this can affect RNA 
folding, but it was not known that living organisms made use of this fact to regulate 
the expression of their own genes. The significance of Nahvi et al’s findings and other 
similar findings around the same time was that a process that was known to be 
biochemically possible was shown to be part of the biological functioning of real 
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organisms. On Millikan’s account, Nahvi et al were correct and this process is part of 
the biological functioning of E. coli only if it has the selected function of controlling 
gene expression, that is to say, if the nucleic acid sequences involved were designed 
by natural selection to control gene expression in the way that they do. However, as 
some critics have pointed out, molecular and cell biologists show little concern to 
provide evidence for such evolutionary assumptions when determining the function of 
molecular parts and processes (Weber, 2005, 35-41; Wouters, 2005b). Nahvi et al no 
doubt assumed that the btuB riboswitch was the product of natural selection, but they 
do not explicitly discuss this. In fact, the discussion of evolution in their paper is 
confined to noting that key elements of the riboswitch are evolutionarily conserved 
and hence that metabolite sensing by RNAs may have evolved early in the history of 
life. Critics of the selected function account have proposed alternative ways to 
distinguish biological functioning from biologically irrelevant processes which I 
discuss in Section five. The point of these alternative analyses is not to deny that 
things like the btuB riboswitch are adaptations, but to show that experimental 
biologists do not need to establish that they are adaptations, let alone the details of 
their adaptive history, before they can determine their function. 
 
Millikan allows one important class of exceptions to the rule that only parts and 
processes have been produced by natural selection are part of an organism’s 
biological functioning. She notes that activities that have been produced by natural 
selection often rely upon parts and processes whose evolution has been entirely 
independent of selection for those activities. For example, the ability to blush depends 
on the redness of blood, but the selective advantages of blushing, whatever they may 
be, do not explain why human beings have red blood. The contributions of such 
adventitiously recruited parts to activities that have been produced by natural 
selection are part of biological functioning (Millikan 2002). Millikan suggests that the 
well-known term ‘exaptation’ is best defined as this use of adventitiously recruited 
pre-existing parts to support new selected functions, a somewhat narrower definition 
than the usage common in biology (e.g. Gould & Vrba, 1982). 
 
A perspective apparently similar to Millikan’s was adopted by the founders of the 
modern, Darwinian study of behaviour Konrad Lorenz and Niko Tinbergen. With his 
sights firmly on the behaviourist tradition, Lorenz sniped that “in many branches of 
the psychological and behavioural sciences it is today quite usual to devise, out of 
hand, some sort of experimental procedure, apply it to a highly complicated system 
about which next to nothing is known, and then record the results.” (Lorenz, 1966, 
274) To use one of Millikan’s metaphors, this is like studying washing machines by 
putting them in outer space, or deep in the ocean, and recording the results of these 
interventions. Lorenz and Tinbergen insisted that students of behaviour must examine 
how animals make a living in their natural environments before subjecting them to 
controlled experimentation. The proper object of washing machine research is 
clothes-washing, and the proper object of animal behaviour research is how animals 
accomplish the tasks that allow them to survive and reproduce in their natural 
environments. However, while I agree that an evolutionary perspective is essential to 
correctly identify what counts as biological functioning, I will argue below that it 
must be a forward-looking and not a backward-looking evolutionary perspective. 
 
4. A paradox for Millikan 
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Millikan has correctly pointed out that in order to study the biological functioning of 
an organism, biologists must identify where one organism ends and another begins, 
must distinguish the functioning of that organism from irrelevant causal processes in 
which the organism is caught up, and must identify and exclude pathological features 
of the organism. She suggests that biologists determine whether something is part of 
an organism’s biological functioning, and thus solve these problems, by determining 
that it has a selected function (or has been exapted to support a selected function). But 
this suggestion generates a paradox, because the first step in determining whether 
something has a selected function is to analyse the contribution it made to biological 
functioning in the past. To show that oddly-shaped sperm have the selected function 
of interfering with the sperm of rival males, it is necessary to show that these sperm 
increased the fitness of ancestral males that produced them by interfering with the 
sperm of rival males. But either we can establish this without knowing the selected 
function of the sperm of those ancestral males, in which case we could do the same 
for living males, or we have to know their selected function in those ancestors, which 
means looking at still earlier ancestors to discover this and so on ad infinitum. This 
argument can be laid out a little more formally as follows: 
 
1. Ascriptions of selected function are generated by causal analysis of the 
capacities of ancestral organisms to survive and reproduce in ancestral 
environments 
2. Hence, if we cannot identify which capacities of ancestral organisms to subject 
to causal analysis without knowing what the parts of those organism were 
selected for in their ancestors, then we face a vicious regress 
3. Therefore, a purely causal analysis of how the parts of ancestors were adaptive 
must be possible without knowing what those parts were adaptations for2 
4. If this is possible for ancestors, it is possible for living organisms 
 
Let me be clear what I am not saying. I am not denying that biologists can establish 
the selected function of parts and processes. I am merely denying that they can 
establish these selected functions as a first step before describing the causal functions 
of those parts and processes. Moreover, I am not denying that proximal biology is in 
some sense illuminated by our understanding of evolution. In fact, I will explain in 
just which sense this is true in Section six. My point is that if biologists really needed 
to make progress in understanding why something evolved before they could begin to 
study what it does, then they could never get started. Biologists must have some way 
of doing proximal biology without information about the selected function of the parts 
and processes which they are studying. But Millikan has argued cogently that 
biologists cannot simply look at complex living systems with a naïve eye and 
automatically discern what counts as biological functioning. So it is time to consider 
the philosophers who have suggested other, non-evolutionary ways in which to define 
biological functioning. 
 
 
5. Can biology do without an evolutionary perspective? 
 
                                                 
2 I am using ‘adaptive’ and ‘adaptation’ in the conventional, neo-Darwinian sense outlined in Section 2 
above. A trait is adaptive if a Cummins-style (1975) functional analysis of an organism’s fitness 
assigns a causal function to that trait. Something is an adaptation if it has a ‘modern history’ selective 
function sensu Godfrey-Smith (1994, see also Griffiths, 1992; 1993). 
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The leading advocate of the view that some areas of biology can do without an 
evolutionary perspective is Arno Wouters (1995, 2003, 2005a, 2005b): 
 
“Functional biology without evolution is incomplete in the sense that it 
ignores many important questions about life, but not in the sense that no aspect 
of life can be understood without invoking evolution” (Wouters, 2005aa, 55) 
 
In traditional biological usage ‘functional biology’ is the study of the mechanisms by 
which organisms do what they do, in contrast to the evolutionary biology, which 
explores why organisms possess these mechanisms (Bock & von Wahlert, 1965). The 
functional/evolutionary distinction is roughly equivalent to Ernst Mayr’s distinction 
between proximal and ultimate biology (Mayr, 1961). The biological usage can be a 
little confusing in the context of philosophical discussions which links the term 
‘function’ so closely to teleological explanation, and hence to the evolutionary or 
‘ultimate’ side of these same dichotomies.  
 
According to Wouters, biologists do not pick out the subject matter of functional 
biology in terms of evolution, and especially not natural selection. He defines 
something similar to what I have called ‘causal function’ which he calls ‘biological 
role’: “the manner in which that item/activity contributes to the activity of a complex 
system”. He contrasts biological role to what he calls 'biological advantage’ – "the 
way in which that trait influences the life chances of an organism as compared to 
other traits that might replace it"(Wouters, 2005a, 41-2). Whilst biological role seems 
to be the same thing as causal function, biological advantage is nothing like selected 
function. Selected function is an historical notion, defined in terms of the actual 
selection pressures that determined the success or failure of the actual ancestors of the 
organisms whose parts have selected functions. Biological advantage is an ecological, 
rather than an historical notion. It can be studied in living organisms without making 
any assumptions about their history, although it does require assumptions about the 
environment in which they live and about biologically plausible alternatives that 
either already exist or might easily evolve in future. In effect, the study of biological 
advantage is the study of what Tinbergen called ‘survival value’: “whether any effect 
of the observed process contributes to survival if so how survival is promoted and 
whether it is promoted better by the observed process than by slightly different 
processes.” (Tinbergen, 1963, 418) In contemporary biology these sorts of questions 
are often tackled using optimality analysis and evolutionary game theory3. I will have 
more to say about these forward-looking evolutionary questions in the next section. 
 
Wouters’ claim that functional biology studies biological role (causal function) as 
well as biological advantage raises an obvious question. Organisms have many 
complex capacities, most of which are biologically irrelevant as Millikan and other 
have pointed out. The parts and processes that make up organisms can be assigned 
causal function relative to any of these overall capacities. Most obviously, the parts of 
                                                 
3 These methods are frequently used to establish what traits are adaptations for (their selected function) 
as well as whether and how traits are currently adaptive. The account of evolutionary explanation 
which I advocate in Section seven below would imply that when this occurs these methods are either 1. 
Applied to hypothesised ancestral organisms in hypothesised ancestral environments, or, 2. Applied to 
current organisms on the assumption that the selective advantage they now confer is one they also 
conferred in the past. Criticisms of both these uses of optimality analysis can be found in the literature 
on ‘adaptationism’ (Dupré, 1987; Gould & Lewontin, 1978; Orzack & Sober, 2001). 
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the body can be assigned causal functions relative to each of the disease processes the 
body is able to undergo. For example, an oncologist may seek to unravel the functions 
of the p53 protein in the genesis of tumours. Organisms have many equally complex 
capacities that are less obvious. Jared Diamond was the first to analyse the capacities 
of different plants and animals to facilitate the rise of dominant world-powers from 
their bioregions in virtue of their nutritional content, amenability to domestication, 
and so forth (Diamond, 1997). Diamond’s work may be a contribution to ecology, 
very broadly construed, but these capacities are not part of the usual subject matter of 
functional biology. The capacities identified by pathologists and by Diamond’s work 
are, of course, interesting in their own right. If we let our imaginations run riot we can 
identify any number of more frivolous complex capacities which are none the less real 
for being frivolous. So a conception of biological role which can underpin a plausible 
definition of the subject matter of functional biology must pick a specific and 
appropriate overall capacity of the organism. The contributions of parts and processes 
to this capacity will make up the specifically biological role of those parts and 
processes. In his earlier papers Wouters conceived this overall capacity as ‘viability’ – 
the ability to stay alive. Functional biology constructs ‘viability explanations’ 
(Wouters, 1995). In more recent papers Wouters has developed a slightly different 
conception of explanation in functional biology which he calls ‘design explanation’ 
(Wouters, 2007). Design explanations are specifically contrastive explanations of 
organisms’ ability to stay alive. The actual traits of organisms are shown to allow 
them to maintain themselves as living systems whilst other, real or hypothetical 
alternative structures would not do so or would do so less effectively. Wouters has 
developed a number of detailed case-studies of explanation in physiology that appear 
to work in just the contrastive manner he describes, and which pay little or no 
attention to the specifics of selection history. These explanations contrast the actual 
trait with hypothetical traits which could never have been evolutionary competitors 
(because they simply do not work) as well as with traits which might have been 
present in the evolutionary past. 
 
Other non-evolutionary accounts of the subject matter of functional biology have 
strong affinities to that of Wouters. The philosopher and neurobiologist Gerhard 
Schlosser has argued that function ascriptions in biology identify the causal 
contributions of parts and processes to an overall capacity for ‘self-re-production’. A 
self-re-producing system is one that can “pass through cyclic sequences of states and 
thereby keep stable in the long run, despite changing continuously” (Schlosser, 1998, 
312). A similar account was proposed by Wayne Christensen (1996) and another has 
been defended in considerable detail by Peter McLaughlin (2001). A related approach 
has been defended by Craig DeLancey (2006), and physiologist Benoni Edin has 
recently argued that physiologists assign functions to parts and processes when they 
make a certain distinctive sort of contribution to solving a problem of ‘active self-
maintenance’ (Edin, 2008). Whilst these authors concentrate on the analysis of 
function locutions, Marcel Weber has developed a broader account of explanation in 
what he calls ‘experimental biology’, a category encompassing much the same group 
of biosciences as Wouter’s functional biology. Weber’s vision of an analytic 
hierarchy of causal role functions is in the tradition of Robert Cummins classic 
account of functional explanation (1975; see also 1983). In the recent philosophical 
literature the concern with naturalising the function/malfunction distinction has 
overshadowed the analysis of less strongly teleological function language. Work from 
the 1970s, such as Cummin’s and that of William Wimsatt (e.g. 1972; 2007) remains 
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amongst the most insightful on the subject. In Weber’s version of causal-functional 
analysis role functions are ascribed relative to some larger role function of a 
containing system, with this hierarchy of roles terminating in ‘some ultimate system 
capacity or system goal’ (Weber, 2005, 39). He suggests that this ultimate system 
capacity may be McLaughlin’s ‘self-reproducibility’, which is the capacity of the 
system to maintain its form over time. This ‘self-reproduction’ must be distinguished 
from reproduction - generating new individuals with the same form. Weber argues 
that an account of how experimental biology defines its subject matter should be 
applicable to sterile individuals as well as to individuals who can reproduce 
themselves. Sterile individuals ‘self-reproduce’ through their lives in McLaughlin’s 
sense, but cannot reproduce4. 
 
The idea that proximal biology can do without an evolutionary perspective has 
seemed compelling to several philosophers and biologist, each of whom have focused 
closely on the actual practice of some area of proximal biology. However, I will show 
in the next section that there are a number of cases in which the criteria they have 
proposed cannot distinguish biological functioning from irrelevant causal processes. 
The plausibility of non-evolutionary analyses, I will argue, comes from the fact that 
they give the same answers as an evolutionary analysis on the specific topics with 
which sciences such as anatomy and physiology have traditionally been concerned. 
But we have already seen that the standard evolutionary analysis leads to a paradox. 
In Section seven, therefore, I offer an alternative evolutionary analysis which avoids 
the paradox. 
 
6. Why we cannot do without an evolutionary perspective 
 
Non-evolutionary accounts of biological functioning draw the boundary between 
biological functioning and other, irrelevant causal processes in which organisms are 
participants in the wrong place. They exclude activities which no-one can seriously 
doubt are examples of biological functioning. This happens because ‘viability’, ‘self-
reproduction’ and the rest are only one component of a more encompassing ability 
which involves activities whose focus is not on the maintenance of the physiological 
individual. For example, the genetic and developmental mechanisms that underpin the 
failure of the mouthparts of mayflies to develop fully after metamorphosis to the adult 
reproductive stage make no sense when analysed for their contribution to the 
individual’s ability to maintain its form (‘self reproduction’). They make perfect sense 
as a contribution to reproduction. In several small Australian Dasyurid species such as 
Antechnius Stuartii a frenzied mating season is followed by a short period during 
which the male’s sexual organs regress and their immune system collapses. Then all 
the males in the population die. The mechanisms that underpin this ‘big bang mating’ 
behavior (Diamond, 1982) obviously do not contribute to the capacity of individual 
males to maintain their form. But they do contribute to the life-history strategy by 
which these males maximize their contributions to future generations. Biologists who 
study these mechanisms are not making a mistake like that of studying the 
‘combustion system’ of kangaroos that get caught in bushfires. The self-immolation 
of the male Antechinus is clearly part of its biological functioning. 
                                                 
4 On the view I advocate below sterile individuals could be dealt with by analysing the causal 
contribution of parts and processes to their inclusive fitness, which may be the correct approach for e.g. 
sterile castes in social insects, or by regarding them as pathological, which may be the correct approach 
for sterile hybrids e.g. mules. 
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Such examples show clearly that biological functioning must be understood in terms 
of reproduction, not only self-reproduction. To the extent that the non-evolutionary 
accounts listed in the last section ignore reproduction, they are clearly inadequate. 
However, Weber’s explicit disavowal of reproduction is not representative of the 
literature as a whole, nor does it seem like a central feature of Weber’s account of 
causal-functional explanation. These authors are primarily concerned to distinguish 
their views from views which advocate the backwards-looking evolutionary definition 
of biological functioning as selected functioning. This leads them to downplay the 
functional analysis of reproductive fitness, even when this was not their intention.  
Wouters, for example, always intended ‘design explanation’ to encompass the design 
of reproductive mechanisms (personal communication). To the extent that the neglect 
of reproductive fitness by these authors is merely a matter of emphasis and choice of 
examples, the view that I present in this paper can be seen as a friendly amendment. 
 
But although the reintroduction of a new, forward-looking evolutionary perspective 
may be compatible with the central tenets of the ‘non-evolutionary’ accounts, it leads 
to a very different vision of what functional biology is trying to explain. Taking an 
evolutionary perspective involves much more than merely adding ‘reproduce’ to 
‘survive and reproduce’. The phrase ‘survive and reproduce’ encompasses everything 
an organism does which has an effect on evolutionary dynamics. Because of this, 
advances in evolutionary theory can imply substantial revisions in what we take to be 
biological functioning and what we take to be irrelevant causal processes in which 
organisms are caught up. For example, the Trivers-Willard hypothesis suggests that 
females can increase their fitness by producing different sex ratios in response to 
seasonal fluctuations in resource abundance. When resources are abundant, females 
should invest more resources in the sex with the higher variance in offspring number, 
typically males. This insight led New Zealand conservation biologists to realize that 
the male-skewed sex ratio that was hampering their efforts to save the Kakapo 
(Strigops habroptilus, a large flightless parrot) was not merely a run of bad luck, but a 
response to the supplementary feeding program that was part of the conservation 
effort (Clout, Elliott, & Robertson, 2002). By enriching the birds’ diet they were 
causing them to produce male offspring and endangering the survival of the species. 
The mechanisms by which birds exercise facultative control over sex ratio will one 
day be understood using the kind of hierarchical functional role analysis discussed in 
the previous section. The ultimate system capacity to which these mechanisms 
contribute, however, will be a conception of survival and reproduction that was not 
available until the early 1970s when population geneticists showed that selection can 
act on variance in offspring number as well as on the expected number of offspring.  
 
The capacity of developments in evolutionary theory to change our understanding of 
what counts as biological functioning is not restricted to traits that are directly 
involved in reproduction. Apparently straightforward aspects of physiology such as 
rate of growth and adult body size can only be properly understood in the light of life 
history theory. For example, it is inaccurate to characterize the broader function of the 
many biological processes that contribute to development as the reproduction of the 
adult form of the organism. The broader function to which these processes contribute 
is the implementation of a life-history strategy involving different allocation of 
resources to growth, tissue-maintenance and reproduction at each stage in the life-
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cycle. The idea that development takes an organism from ‘egg to adult’ is a crude 
approximation to what, in the light of evolution, we now know to be happening. 
 
The idea that every aspect of an organism must be interpreted in the light of its 
contribution to evolution sounds suspiciously like a commitment to an extreme 
version of ‘empirical adaptationism’ (Godfrey-Smith, 2000). Empirical adaptationism 
is the claim that every aspect of the organism has been finely tuned by natural 
selection. But to suppose that I advocate this view is to miss the point entirely. Even if 
organisms manage all the trade-offs mentioned in the last paragraph very badly, so 
that they are not particularly well-adapted, managing these trade-offs is what they are 
doing. A runner who falls far behind and staggers does not thereby transform the race 
into a staggering contest. To continue the analogy, I am not arguing that all organisms 
are great runners: I am arguing that they are all in a race. 
 
There is a substantial question about which parts of the physical world, and which 
properties of those parts, form the subject matter of biology. The examples discussed 
in this section suggest that any adequate solution to this problem must pay attention to 
the role of parts and processes in evolution, as well as their role in the maintenance of 
the physiological individual. The capacities for ‘self-reproducibility’ and ‘viability’ 
identified by non-evolutionary accounts of biological functioning represent part but 
not all of what organisms must do in order to survive and reproduce in the full, 
evolutionary sense. Non-evolutionary accounts of biological functioning can therefore 
be seen as special cases of the account to be developed below, an idea I will return to 
in Section nine. 
 
 
7. An evolutionary perspective without paradox 
 
I have argued that an evolutionary perspective on biological functioning is necessary 
(Section six) but that the usual interpretation of what constitutes an evolutionary 
perspective leads to a vicious regress (Section four). This paradox can be avoided by 
distinguishing two kinds of biological functioning which are privileged from an 
evolutionary viewpoint, only one of which gives rise to the paradox. This distinction 
is inspired by two of the four questions in Niko Tinbergen’s famous essay ‘On the 
Aims and Methods of Ethology’ (1963). Tinbergen suggested that to understand any 
living organism we need to answer four questions: 
 
1. Causation 
2. Survival value 
3. Ontogeny 
4. Evolution 
 
Questions of causation ask about the mechanisms by which organisms do what they 
do, and questions of ontogeny ask how those mechanisms are built. Taken collectively 
these two correspond to Mayr’s (1961) ‘proximal biology’. The important distinction 
for my purposes, however, is that which Tinbergen draws between ‘survival value’ 
and ‘evolution’. 
 
Questions of survival value ask: “whether any effect of the observed process 
contributes to survival if so how survival is promoted and whether it is promoted 
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better by the observed process than by slightly different processes.” (1963, 118) It is 
clear in context that Tinbergen understands ‘survival’ in the broad sense of both 
individual survival to reproductive maturity and reproduction, just as his student 
Richard Dawkins did when he was inspired by Tinbergen to describe organisms as 
‘survival machines’ (Dawkins, Halliday, & Dawkins, 1991, xii). The study of survival 
value is simultaneously evolutionary, because it is guided by our best current models 
of evolution, and ‘methodologically creationist’ in the sense that it is logically 
independent of past evolution. Tinbergen himself put the point this way “even if the 
present-day animals were created the way they are now, the fact that they manage to 
survive would pose the problem of how they do this.” (1963, 423 my emphasis). Even 
creationists must study survival value or abandon a key biological question, namely 
why some populations, and some variants within a population, are increasing in 
numbers or decreasing or staying constant. 
 
Tinbergen’s fourth question concerns evolution. The study of evolution has “two 
major aims: the elucidation of the course evolution must be assumed to have taken, 
and the unraveling of its dynamics.” (1963, 428)  The course of evolution is revealed 
by inferring phylogenies and homologies. The dynamics of evolution are revealed by 
the study of 1) population genetics and 2) survival value (1963, 428), which 
correspond to the ‘consequence laws’ and ‘source laws’ in Elliot Sober’s (1984) 
analysis of evolutionary theory. So while evolutionary questions concern the 
historical trajectory that brought organisms to their present state, questions of survival 
value concern evolutionary processes going on from moment to moment in current 
populations. 
 
Tinbergen’s concept of ‘survival value’ opens up the possibility of a genuinely 
evolutionary perspective that is not an historical perspective, and thus not prone to the 
vicious regress identified in Section four. Rather than focusing on causal capacities 
that featured in past episodes of selection, we should focus on causal capacities that 
contribute to survival and reproduction (survival value). Both of these foci constitute 
‘evolutionary perspectives’ on biological functioning. The first identifies biological 
functioning with parts and processes performing their selected functions. The second 
identifies biological functioning with parts and processes performing causal functions 
which contribute to survival and reproduction. The first is a backward-looking 
evolutionary perspective, seeking to view current organisms in the light of what we 
know about their evolution. It is because the perspective is backwards-looking that it 
generates a vicious regress when it is used to define biological functioning. The 
alternative is a forward-looking evolutionary perspective, seeking to view current 
organisms in the light of what we know about the evolutionary process. The vicious 
regress is avoided by adopting this forward-looking evolutionary perspective on the 
organism. Although this approach asks profoundly evolutionary questions, the 
answers to those questions are available through experimental analysis of living 
organisms and their interactions with the environment. As Tinbergen says, it is the 
“confusion of the study of natural selection with that of survival value” (1963, 418) 
which leads to the mistaken view that survival value cannot be studied by “exact 
experimentation”.  
 
The fact that the study of survival value is ‘methodologically creationist’ should not 
be surprising. Any dynamical theory that explains how things change moment by 
moment can be used both to explain how things are now and to predict how they will 
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be in the future. These two applications of the theory are logically independent. For 
example, we can use the same physics to explain how the planets got where they are 
today, given that they were in certain locations yesterday, and to predict where they 
will be tomorrow, given where they are today. Someone whose religion tells them the 
planets were created last night will reject this explanation of how they got where they 
are today. But this bizarre belief does not prevent them using the very same physics to 
predict where the planets will be tomorrow. In the same way, someone who insists 
that the world was created a few thousand years ago will reject evolutionary 
explanations, but the populations they see around them are continually evolving, a 
fact that has many practical implications from conservation biology to the treatment 
of epidemic disease. Regardless of their beliefs about the past, a creationist who wants 
to understand the present will need the full apparatus of evolutionary theory. 
 
8. Clarifications and replies to objections 
 
1. In earlier work I have criticized the view that biological parts and processes are 
defined by their selected function on rather different grounds. I argued that it 
overlooks the central role of homology in biological classification (Griffiths, 2006, 
2007a; 2007b). This criticism was first made in an important paper by Ronald 
Amundson and George Lauder, who suggested that a “a glance in any comparative 
anatomy textbook” should be enough to refute the view that anatomical parts are 
defined by the function for which they were selected (Amundson & Lauder, 1994, 
453).  
 
I take the arguments in this paper to be consistent with the claim that the fundamental 
identity of the parts and processes studied in experimental biology is given by 
homology. Question like ‘which bone is that?’ and ‘which gene is that?’ are answered 
by classifying those bones and genes by homology. Thus, for example, the long bones 
which support the wing membrane of a bat are homologous to my fingers. This is part 
of the answer to the question ‘which bones do bats use to support their wing 
membranes?’ The single opsin gene on the X-chromosome of a marmoset is 
homologous to both the medium and long-wave opsin genes on my own X 
chromosome. This is part of the answer to the question ‘which genes are these ones on 
the human X chromosome that allow humans to distinguish colours?’ To identify a 
part or process is to identify which parts it corresponds to in other organisms. Since 
the 1840s biologists have referred to this relation of correspondence as ‘homology’5. 
Since Darwin they have defined homology as descent from a common ancestor, 
although in recent years developmental definitions of homology have been proposed. 
Categories defined by selected function, however, are categories of evolutionary 
analogy. Biologists have traditionally recognized homology and analogy as 
complementary principles of classification. Analogies potentially unite many different 
homologues which have some shared feature in their selection history. Thus, for 
example, the category ‘wing’ is defined by analogy, but the anatomical features of 
birds, bats, pterosaurs and insects that fall under that category are defined by 
                                                 
5 Some molecular biologists use the term ‘homology’ to mean sequence similarity, and most molecular 
biologists refer to different forms of homology, resulting from different copying mechanisms, as 
‘orthology’, ‘paralogy’ and ‘xenology’ (on this and other aspects of the homology concept see 
Brigandt, 2002, 2003; Griffiths, 2006, 2007a) 
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homology. Different things (homologues) have been adapted in each of these four 
lineages to become the same thing (analogue). 
 
In this earlier work I also argued that biologists can straightforwardly describe the 
form and (causal) function of parts and processes, and that this descriptive biology 
provides the evidence base for claims about both homology and analogy (Griffiths 
2007a, see also Winther 2006). The arguments developed in this paper suggest that 
this descriptive work is guided by evolutionary theory in a more fundamental sense 
than I had previously realized.  This may explain why some earlier philosophers have 
supposed that even straightforward biological descriptions make implicit claims about 
the selective history of the relevant parts (Neander, 2002; Rosenberg, 2001, 2006). 
This, however, leads to the paradox that I outlined in Section four. If biologists 
needed to know why something evolved before they could describe its form and 
function then they could never get of the ground. 
 
2. A common response when I have presented the paradox described in Section four 
above is that while biologists cannot know the selected function of a part before they 
describe it, they can hypothesize a selected function and this hypothesis helps them 
describe its form and (causal) function. If we examine this suggestion in more detail, 
however, it morphs into the alternative, forward-looking heuristic that I have 
advocated in this paper. Suppose that a biologist examines a stretch of genome or a 
body part of a little-studied organism. They can draw on no prior understanding of the 
role this part plays in the life or the organism, or even whether it really is part of the 
organism, as opposed to a parasite. So they have to face the questions identified by 
Millikan (Section three). Can it seriously be suggested that the first thing they should 
do is to hypothesise that the part evolved because of a particular set of selection 
pressures? What reason could there be to choose one selection pressure rather than 
another, given that nothing is known about the form and function of the part? Instead, 
I think what people have in mind here is that the initial descriptive biology is a search 
for how the part contributes to the organism’s survival and reproduction. It is guided 
by previously researched examples of how parts contribute to survival and 
reproduction. If it can be established that the newly discovered part makes some such 
contribution, then this may very well be why the part evolved. However, it was not 
that historical hypothesis that played the heuristic role in the initial description of the 
system, but the idea of looking for contributions to survival and reproduction and for 
distinctive kinds of contribution that are familiar from other organisms. In other 
words, it is the forward-looking evolutionary perspective that guides an initial 
biological description, not the backward-looking evolutionary perspective. 
 
3. Another common response is that, since the forward-looking evolutionary 
perspective must be applied to organisms in their ‘natural habitat’ and this, it is 
argued, can only mean their historical habitat, there is no real difference between the 
forward-looking and backward-looking perspective. I am not convinced that the 
premise of this argument is correct. So-called ‘invasion biology’ studies how 
introduced organisms survive all too well in environments that are definitely not those 
in which they evolved. Invasion biologists successfully answer Tinbergen’s question 
‘how do they do this?’ and they do not seem to face insuperable problems in defining 
biological functioning. But it does seem to be true that, for example, it is more 
illuminating to study a lion on the savannah than a lion in a cage, and this is 
something I need to explain. I suggest that there are two, independent reasons why 
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explanations of how organisms survive and reproduce in historically normal 
environments are more illuminating than explanations of how they survive and 
reproduce (if they do) in novel environments. First, in many novel environments 
organisms do not work very well, and it is typically more interesting to understand 
how a mechanism achieves some impressive feat of natural engineering than how it 
barely gets by or fails outright. When an organism does spectacularly well in a novel 
environment, however, like the Cane Toad so catastrophically introduced to Australia, 
it can be very interesting to understand how it does so well. Second, one of the main 
reasons for studying survival value is to go on to answer Tinbergen’s fourth, 
evolutionary question. Understanding how organisms survive and reproduce in their 
historically normal environment is more relevant to this further question than 
understanding how they perform in novel environments. Both of these ideas are 
consistent with my claim that it is the forward-looking evolutionary perspective that 
actually guides biological research. In the case of the lion, what is studied in the 
natural, savannah habitat, or in a model of that habitat, is how the parts of the lion 
causally contribute to survival and reproduction. This research is guided by exemplars 
of how parts contribute to survival and reproduction in other organisms or other 
models. The results provide support for hypotheses about how the parts evolved 
(selected function). None of this involves the paradox-inducing appeal to historical 
information discussed in Section four. 
 
4. After presenting this material at conferences I have encountered a number of 
objections which identify something about the actual selective history of an organism 
that, in conjunction with some other facts, can form part of an argument for or against 
some hypothesis about form or causal function in that organism. The objectors take 
this to refute my view. But the arguments presented above do not commit me to the 
extreme position targeted by such objections. I have identified one pattern of 
argument in which claims about selected function are used to support claims in 
proximal biology, a pattern which earlier authors have suggested is extremely 
important (Section three). I have pointed out that this pattern of reasoning leads to a 
vicious regress (Section four). I have suggested a way to do without it (Section 
seven). This does not imply that that nothing we might know about the selective 
history of organisms could play a role in any argument for any claim in proximal 
biology!  
 
5. Given the prominence of debate over ‘adaptationism’ in evolutionary biology 
(Dupré, 1987; Gould & Lewontin, 1978; Orzack & Sober, 2001) I should clarify how 
the arguments of this paper relate to that debate. Peter Godfrey-Smith has 
distinguished three kinds of ‘adaptationism’ (Godfrey-Smith, 2000). ‘Empirical 
adaptationism’ is the thesis that almost all aspects of organisms are finely tuned by 
natural selection. The approach to defining biological functioning that I have 
defended here does not assume empirical adaptationism. Even if organisms were 
highly constrained in their ability to respond to selection, biologists could still answer 
Tinbergen’s question about ‘survival value’ and could still define biological 
functioning using the forward-looking evolutionary heuristic. Biological functioning 
would still be a matter of survival and reproduction, but organisms would not be as 
good at surviving and reproducing as an enthusiastic empirical adaptationist might 
suppose.  
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Godfrey-Smith identifies two other forms of adaptationism. ‘Methodological 
adaptationism’ makes no commitments about how well-adapted organisms are, but 
contends that the study of adaptation as the best way to identify both adaptations and 
constraints on adaptation. ‘Explanatory adaptationism’ contends that the adaptation of 
organisms to their environment is the primary thing that biologists should seek to 
explain. It seems intuitively plausible that the approach to defining biological 
functioning that I have defended here might lend support to either of these two theses, 
but I do not have any substantive arguments to link them, and it may be that this 
intuition is misguided. 
 
6. While the arguments in this paper are in some danger of being condemned as 
excessively adaptationist, they are equally likely to be pilloried as ‘anti-evolutionary’. 
So let me reiterate that I am not suggesting we cannot or should not study how 
particular organisms actually evolved. My point is that the success of such studies for 
any particular species is not and cannot be a necessary precursor to successful work 
on the ‘proximal’ biology of that species.   
 
9. Summary and conclusions 
 
Millikan and others have identified a genuine problem with the definition of 
biological functioning. Although it is easy to overlook it once the problem has been 
solved, the proximal biology of organisms needs to be conducted against a 
background of assumptions about where one organism ends and the next begins, 
about the range of conditions under which the organism is actually functioning as 
opposed to participating in irrelevant causal processes such as burning in a forest fire, 
and about which traits need to be studied as part of the organisms functioning as 
opposed to part of its malfunctioning (pathology). The fact that sperm are part of our 
reproductive machinery was not obvious to those who discovered them, nor was the 
purpose for which they rotate their flagella. Just which features of sperm morphology 
are pathological remains in dispute today.  
 
The consensus that these problems are solved by examining the selective history of 
the parts and processes that make up organisms has come under attack in recent years. 
Proximal biologists often do not have the data needed to establish evolutionary 
scenarios for the mechanisms they study, and they typically make no effort to obtain 
it. This has led several philosophers and biologists to argue that biologists answer 
Millikan’s questions in other ways. These non-evolutionary accounts identify a 
general causal capacity, such as ‘viability’ or ‘self-reproduction’, that defines 
biological functioning. These causal capacities are ahistorical properties of actual 
organisms, and so whether a part or process contributes to such a capacity is 
something that can be ascertained by experimental investigation. This ahistorical, 
non-evolutionary account seems to fit better with how biologists actually approach 
these questions.  
 
I have offered a more principled objection to the conventional, backward-looking 
evolutionary definition of biological functioning. If we cannot describe the biological 
functioning of an organism without understanding why it evolved, then we will face a 
vicious regress, since the only way to understand why it evolved is to describe the 
biological functioning of its ancestors. 
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I have rejected existing ahistorical, non-evolutionary definitions of biological 
functioning, however, on the grounds that many aspects of the biological functioning 
of organisms can only be understood as mechanisms contributing to the evolutionary 
success of the organisms. In their place I have offered an ahistorical but still 
evolutionary definition. All and only those parts and processes that contribute to the 
capacity of an organism for survival and reproduction, construed in terms of our 
current best theory of evolutionary dynamics, are aspects of its biological functioning. 
Millikan’s question about where one organism ends and another begins is the well-
known question of the units of evolution. Millikan’s questions about which causal 
processes are part of biological functioning and which are irrelevant is answered by 
determining which processes are part of the explanation of how organisms survive 
and reproduce. Millikan’s question about what is pathology and what ‘normal’ 
variation is answered in the same way. Answering each of these questions is hard, and 
the quality of our answers will reflect how well we understand the evolutionary 
process. In Section six I described some aspects of biological functioning that were 
‘invisible’ until the relevant developments in evolutionary theory. These include the 
biology of aging, and life history strategy more generally, and aspects of reproductive 
biology such as the facultative control of sex ratio. Further advances in understanding 
evolution will have a similar, transforming effect on our understanding of biological 
functioning. 
 
The new evolutionary perspective that I propose can be seen as a ‘friendly 
amendment’ to the non-evolutionary accounts or to accounts like Wouters (2007) that 
are not explicitly non-evolutionary, but which do not emphasize the analysis of 
reproductive fitness. The fact that ‘experimental’ (Weber, 2005) or ‘functional’ 
(Wouters, 2007) biology is framed by an evolutionary perspective has not been 
apparent to some authors, I believe, because much of this research is still 
documenting basic mechanisms and its conclusions are not yet detailed enough to 
require an exact specification  of the causal capacity to which these mechanisms 
contribute. For the purpose of elucidating the general mechanisms of nervous 
transmission, for example, the theory that organisms have the ultimate goal of just 
staying alive is as good as the theory that they have the ultimate goal of survival and 
reproduction. Much of functional biology studies causal roles that would be common 
ground even between Darwinians and creationists. No creationist would demur at the 
suggestion that God’s purpose in creating calcium channels in the walls of neurons 
was that they should play a role in the generation and transmission of nerve impulses. 
A forward-looking evolutionary perspective will give the same answer as the non-
evolutionary perspective in many cases. It is superior because there are test cases 
where the non-evolutionary perspective breaks down.  
 
The forward-looking evolutionary perspective achieves this superiority because it 
embodies the advances in our understanding of biological functioning that have been 
produced by the theory of evolution. Advances such as Darwin’s concept of sexual 
selection or post-Hamiltonian ideas about life history give us a better understanding of 
what is going on when we look at an organism. If we understand evolutionary theory, 
then we can see things that were invisible to earlier biologists. This is shown 
dramatically by the example of the Kakapo’s reproductive strategy given in Section 
six. But in contrast to the conventional idea that it is our understanding of the 
specifics of evolutionary history that provides this insight, I have argued that our 
understanding of evolution influences our understanding of biological functioning by 
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contributing to our general grasp of what it is to evolve and thus of what it is to 
function. Success in understanding how evolution shapes the characters of organisms 
enriches our understanding of the kinds of mechanisms that can affect the future 
evolutionary trajectory of populations, and thus our understanding of biological 
functioning. 
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